USA v. Gricco by unknown
2002 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-9-2002 
USA v. Gricco 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Gricco" (2002). 2002 Decisions. 8. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/8 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2002 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed January 9, 2002 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
Nos. 00-2149 and 00-2179 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ANTHONY J. GRICCO, 
 
       Appellant in 00-2149 
 
WILLIAM T. MCCARDELL 
 
       William McCardell, 
       Appellant in 00-2179 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
(Dist. Court Nos. 99-cr-00202-1 and 99-cr-00202-2) 
District Court Judge: Clarence C. Newcomer 
 
Argued March 8, 2001 
 
Before: ALITO and MCKEE and KRAVITCH,* 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: January 9, 2002) 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
* The Honorable Phyllis A. Kravitch, Senior Circuit Judge, United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation. 
  
       F. Emmett Fitzpatrick (Argued) 
       926 Public Ledger Building 
       610 Chestnut Street 
       Philadelphia, PA 19106 
 
        Counsel for Appellant 
       William T. McCardell (No. 00-2179) 
 
       Peter Goldberger (Argued) 
       Pamela A. Wilk, Esq. 
       50 Rittenhouse Place 
       Ardmore, PA 19003-2276 
 
        Counsel for Appellant 
       Anthony J. Gricco (No. 00-2149) 
 
       Michael R. Stiles, U.S. Attorney 
       Walter S. Batty, Jr. 
       Louis D. Lappen (Argued) 
       Richard J. Zack (Argued) 
       Office of the United States Attorney 
       615 Chestnut Street, Ste. 1250 
       Philadelphia, PA 19106-4476 
 
        Counsel for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellants Anthony Gricco and Michael McCardell were 
convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States, tax 
evasion, and making false tax returns. All of the charges 
related to the conspirators' failure to report on their 
personal income tax returns money that had been stolen 
from airport parking facilities. We affirm the appellants' 
convictions, but we vacate their sentences and remand for 
further sentencing proceedings and resentencing. 
 
I. 
 
From 1990 to 1994, Anthony Gricco was the regional 
manager for private companies that contracted with the 
Philadelphia Parking Authority to operate the parking 
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facilities at the Philadelphia International Airport. Gricco 
was responsible for the general operation of the facilities, 
including the hiring of employees and the collection of 
parking fees. Michael McCardell, Gricco's brother-in-law, 
was Gricco's chief assistant. McCardell oversaw the day-to- 
day activities of the tollbooths and picked up money from 
the cashiers at the end of their shifts. 
 
The parking facilities at the airport used automated ticket 
machines as well as cashiers. Upon entering a lot, a 
customer would take a ticket from a machine. The date and 
time would be printed on the ticket and encoded in the 
magnetic strip on the back. To leave the lot, the customer 
would drive to a tollbooth and the ticket would be put into 
another machine. This machine would read the date and 
time of issuance, calculate the length of time that the 
customer had parked in the lot, and display the parking fee 
owed. The customer would then pay the cashier in the 
tollbooth. At the end of a shift, each cashier would bundle 
together the tickets and cash received and put them in a 
brown bag labeled with the cashier's name and the number 
of the tollbooth. Each cashier would also place in the bag 
a tape from the ticket-reading machine that provided a 
record of the tickets that the machine had processed. The 
supervisors then would forward the bags to Gricco's 
assistants. 
 
In early 1990, Gricco, McCardell, and others made a plan 
to steal money by substituting customers' real tickets with 
replacement tickets showing false dates and times of entry. 
A customer who had parked in the lot for a long period of 
time would have a real ticket reflecting a high parking fee. 
On leaving the lot, the customer would pay this fee to the 
cashier. However, instead of inserting the real ticket into 
the ticket-reading machine, a cashier participating in the 
scheme would insert a replacement ticket, and the machine 
would calculate the parking fee based on the false date and 
time stamped on the replacement ticket. This replacement 
ticket would indicate that the customer had parked for only 
a short period of time, and thus the parking fee would be 
much lower. The thieves would pocket the difference 
between the amount paid by the customer and the amount 
of the fee shown on the replacement tickets. 
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Michael Flannery, a technician for the company 
responsible for maintaining the ticket machines, provided 
the replacement tickets. Flannery also disabled the fare 
displays on the ticket-reading machines so that customers 
could not see that the parking fees that they were paying 
were higher than the fees recorded by the machines. 
 
Flannery initially supplied Gricco with replacement 
tickets by removing tickets from the ticket-issuing 
machines and then resetting the counters on those 
machines. In the beginning, Flannery obtained 30 tickets a 
day using this method, and one cashier, enlisted by Gricco, 
used the replacement tickets to steal cash. Gricco 
scheduled either McCardell or David Million, another 
supervisor, to oversee the tollbooth plaza at which this 
cashier worked. Gradually, more corrupt cashiers were 
enlisted, and eventually Flannery began printing counterfeit 
tickets. 
 
Gricco, McCardell, Million, and Flannery expanded their 
scheme over the next four years. At first, Gricco enlisted 
cashiers who had engaged in a similar but smaller scheme 
in 1988. Eventually Gricco recruited about 15 other 
cashiers to participate. Flannery delivered the counterfeit 
tickets that he manufactured to Gricco, McCardell, or 
McCardell's wife. McCardell then distributed the 
replacement tickets to the corrupt cashiers, and at the end 
of their shifts, McCardell picked up the stolen money and 
forwarded it to Gricco, who distributed the money among 
the participants. The cashiers received a portion of the 
proceeds stolen during their shifts, and the rest was divided 
into four equal shares for Gricco, McCardell, Million, and 
Flannery. 
 
The leading participants in the scheme did not report 
their unlawful income on their federal income tax returns. 
Gricco kept his money in a safe, loaned cash to others and 
received repayments in the form of checks or money orders, 
gave cash to family members, and placed real estate under 
his family members' names. Through a real estate broker 
named Ludwig Cappozi, Gricco purchased several 
properties for cash. Capozzi also engaged in real estate 
transactions with McCardell's wife, who used cash to 
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purchase properties under both her own and McCardell's 
name. 
 
The cashiers involved in the scheme also failed to report 
their unlawful income on their income tax returns. They did 
not deposit their embezzled funds into banks for fear of 
being detected by the Internal Revenue Service. Gricco 
cautioned some cashiers not to put their money in banks, 
and he advised Flannery and Million to invest in real estate 
through Capozzi. 
 
The scheme ended in September 1994, when the 
Philadelphia District Attorney's Office executed search 
warrants at the airport. In July 1996, the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania brought state charges of theft, forgery, and 
unlawful use of a computer against Gricco, McCardell, 
Flannery, Million, and numerous cashiers. The cashiers 
waived their right to a jury trial and were convicted in the 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. After a three-day jury 
trial, Gricco, McCardell, and Million were acquitted, and the 
judge dismissed Flannery's case. 
 
In April 1999, a federal grand jury returned an 
indictment against Gricco, McCardell, Million, and Flannery 
for conspiracy to defraud the United States by obstructing 
the lawful function of the Internal Revenue Service in the 
collection of federal income taxes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 371; tax evasion, in violation of 26 U.S.C.S 7201; and 
making false federal income tax returns, in violation of 26 
U.S.C. S 7206(1). Prior to trial, Million and Flannery 
pleaded guilty and agreed to testify for the prosecution. 
Gricco and McCardell proceeded to trial. 
 
The jury found Gricco and McCardell guilty on all counts. 
The government submitted a sentencing memorandum 
asserting that the total amount stolen between 1990 and 
1994 was $3.4 million and that the tax loss was $952,000 
(i.e., 28% of $3.4 million). The presentence reports adopted 
the conclusion that the tax loss was $952,000 and applied 
the base-offense level corresponding to that amount. Gricco 
and McCardell submitted written objections to these 
calculations, as well as to various other statements in the 
presentence report concerning their roles in the airport 
theft. 
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The district court held a sentencing hearing. The court 
first briefly paraphrased the parts of the presentence 
reports relating to the sentencing enhancements. The court 
gave Gricco and McCardell an opportunity to present 
evidence for sentencing purposes, but they declined and 
instead rested on their written submissions. The court then 
stated that it had read each party's arguments and would 
adopt the facts set out in the presentence reports. 
 
The district court sentenced Gricco to 120 months of 
imprisonment and McCardell to 108 months of 
imprisonment. The court also sentenced each defendant to 
three years of supervised release, a $75,000 fine, and $700 
in special assessments. Gricco and McCardell appealed. 
 
II. 
 
The appellants contend that their convictions for 
conspiracy are not supported by sufficient evidence. The 
appellants were convicted for a so-called "Klein" conspiracy1 
-- a conspiracy to defraud the United States by obstructing 
the lawful function of the Internal Revenue Service in 
assessing and collecting federal income taxes. See United 
States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 956 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 
In order for a Klein conspiracy to exist, an agreed-upon 
objective must be to impede the IRS. Ingram v. United 
States, 360 U.S. 672, 679-80 (1959). This need not be the 
sole or even a major objective of the conspiracy. Id. In 
addition, impeding the IRS need not be an objective that is 
sought as an end in itself: an intent to hide unlawful 
income from the IRS in order to conceal an underlying 
crime is enough. See, e.g., United States v. Furkin, 119 F.3d 
1276, 1280-81 (7th Cir. 1997). Moreover, in a Klein 
conspiracy case, as in other conspiracy prosecutions, the 
objectives of the conspiracy may sometimes be inferred 
from the conduct of the participants. See, e.g. , United 
States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679, 684 (3d Cir. 1999). In 
the end, however, the evidence must be sufficient to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that impeding the IRS was one 
of the conspiracy's objects and not merely a foreseeable 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957). 
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consequence or collateral effect. See United States v. 
Goldberg, 105 F.3d 770, 774 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[M]ere 
collateral effects of jointly agreed-to activity, even if 
generally foreseeable, are not mechanically to be treated as 
an object of the conspiracy.") United States v. Adkinson, 
158 F.2d 1147, 1154 (11th Cir. 1998) (The government 
must "prove that there was an agreement whose purpose 
was to impede the IRS (the conspiracy), and that each 
defendant knowingly participated in that 
conspiracy."(emphasis omitted)). In determining whether 
the evidence is sufficient, we must of course view the proof 
in the light most favorable to the verdict and ask whether 
any rational jury could have found that the government met 
its burden. See, e.g., United States v. Frorup, 963 F.2d, 41, 
42 (3d Cir. 1992). In this case, the government contends 
that the evidence is sufficient to meet this standard and 
relies chiefly on three categories of circumstantial proof. 
 
First, the government relies on evidence that Gricco, 
McCardell, and other participants in the scheme did not 
report their illicit income. This evidence of parallel 
individual conduct has some probative value for present 
purposes, but it is plainly not enough by itself to show an 
agreed-upon objective to impede the IRS. It would not be at 
all surprising if all of these participants independently 
reached the conclusion that it would be best not to report 
their illicit income -- either because they feared attracting 
investigative attention or because they simply wanted to 
keep the money that they would have been required to pay 
in taxes if the extra income had been reported. Accordingly, 
the mere fact that participants in the scheme did not report 
the income in question cannot reasonably be viewed as 
giving rise to a strong inference that the participants agreed 
upon this course of action. 
 
Second, the government points to evidence that Gricco 
and Capozzi, the real estate broker who assisted him in 
purchasing property, structured various financial 
transactions so as to avoid the filing of currency 
transaction reports.2 In addition, the government notes that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Under 31 U.S.C. S 5313(a) and 31 C.F.R.S 103.22(b)(1), financial 
institutions must file a currency transaction report when they engage in 
a cash transaction in excess of $10,000. 
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on one occasion Gricco told Million never to "put any large 
sums of money in the bank, to be careful with that, 
especially anything over $10,000 because that would 
generate a report the bank would send to the IRS." Gov't 
Brief at 40. This proof has some probative significance for 
present purposes because Gricco's desire to avoid the filing 
of currency transaction reports could have stemmed from a 
fear that such reports would interfere with his plan to 
evade the payment of taxes on the illicit income. We 
recognize, however, that the value of this evidence is 
limited. The appellants were not convicted of conspiring to 
violate the anti-structuring statutes, see 31 U.S.C. S 5322- 
23, but with conspiring to obstruct the IRS in the 
assessment and collection of taxes, and structuring does 
not necessarily result in the evasion of taxes. 
 
The government's best evidence against Gricco is 
testimony that he told various participants not to deposit 
their illicit income in a bank but instead to purchase safes 
for their homes. These individuals testified that they 
followed this advice because they did not want to attract 
the attention of the IRS. It is likely that a person who 
acquires illegal cash and places that cash in a home safe, 
rather than a bank, will not report the cash as income on 
his or her tax returns. Accordingly, a rational jury could 
infer that Gricco knew that the participants to whom he 
gave this advice would, in all likelihood, not pay tax on 
their illicit income. 
 
The difficult question is whether a rational jury could go 
further and find that Gricco not only foresaw that this 
would occur but actually intended for it to occur. Although 
the question is close, we conclude that the evidence, viewed 
as a whole, could persuade a rational jury to make such a 
finding. A rational jury could conclude that, if participants 
in the embezzlement scheme had reported their illicit 
income, this might have sparked an investigation that 
might have ultimately led to Gricco. Thus, not only did 
Gricco have strong grounds to foresee that the participants 
he advised would not report their illegal income, but a 
rational jury could conclude that he had also a reason to 
desire this result and that the result was something that he 
specifically intended. Viewing all of the evidence against 
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Gricco together, we hold that it is sufficient to support his 
conspiracy conviction. 
 
We reach the same conclusion respecting McCardell. 
McCardell admitted that Gricco told him to purchase a safe 
and that he did so. A rational jury could infer that 
McCardell agreed upon the objective of not reporting or 
paying taxes on the illicit income because to do so would 
have created a risk of discovery. We cannot say that the 
evidence against McCardell is insufficient as a matter of 
law. 
 
III. 
 
In addition to the conspiracy count, Gricco and 
McCardell were each convicted of multiple counts of tax 
evasion, in violation of 26 U.S.C. S 7201, and making false 
tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. S 7206(1). Gricco and 
McCardell contend that their convictions for violating 
S 7201 and S 7206(1) merge and that the district court 
therefore erred in entering judgments of convictions and 
sentences under both provisions. 
 
Neither Gricco nor McCardell raised this argument in the 
district court, and therefore our review is governed by Fed. 
R. Crim. Proc. 52 (b), which provides that "[p]lain errors or 
defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although 
they were not brought to the attention of the court." In 
order to reverse under Rule 52(b), "[t]here must be an 
`error' that is `plain' and that `affect[s] substantial rights.' " 
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). 
"Moreover, Rule 52(b) leaves the discretion to correct the 
forfeited error within the sound discretion of the court of 
appeals, and the court should not exercise that discretion 
unless the error " `seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity 
or public reputation of judicial proceedings." ' " Id. (citations 
omitted). 
 
In this case, the parties' briefs focus primarily on the 
question whether the district court committed any sort of 
error at all, and both sides advance reasonable arguments 
relating to that question. Whether a defendant may be 
punished under two separate statutory provisions for the 
same act or transaction depends on the intent of the 
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lawmakers. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 861 
(1985). It is presumed, however, that punishment under 
both provisions was not intended if the provisions proscribe 
the "same offense," see, e.g., Rutledge v. United States, 517 
U.S. 292, 297 (1996), and whether two provisions proscribe 
the same offense is generally determined by applying the 
rule set out in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 
304 (1932), which asks whether each offense requires proof 
of an element that the other does not. If each offense 
contains such an element, it is presumed, subject to 
rebuttal, that multiple punishment is allowed. See 
Rutledge, 517 U.S. at 297; Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. 
 
In the present case, the government argues that the 
offenses of tax evasion (26 U.S.C. S 7201) and making a 
false return (26 U.S.C. S 7206(1)) each contain an element 
that the other lacks. The offense of tax evasion requires 
proof of an attempt to evade the payment of a tax that is 
due, whereas the offense of making a false return does not 
require proof of this element: a taxpayer who makes a 
material misstatement of fact on a return may be convicted 
under 26 U.S.C. S 7206(1) even if the taxpayer pays the full 
amount that is due. Similarly, the offense of making a false 
return requires proof of a false statement on a return, 
whereas a violation of 26 U.S.C. S 7201 may be shown even 
if the taxpayer did not file a return at all. 
 
The defendants argue, however, that the Blockburger test 
merely raises a presumption that Congress meant to permit 
punishment under both provisions, that many other 
circuits have held that the offenses of tax evasion and 
making a false return merge when they are based on the 
same act,3 and that the Supreme Court in Sansone v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 858-59 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(S 7206 and S 7201 convictions merge where both were premised on the 
same improper tax deductions); United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 
1466, 1487-88 (6th Cir. 1991) (simultaneous convictions for S 7201 and 
S 7206 may stand only where proof of tax evasion does not necessarily 
prove the preparation and filing of a fraudulent return); United States v. 
Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 99 (2d Cir. 1991) (S 7201 and S 7206 counts 
merge where both were premised on omission of the same item of income 
from the same tax returns); United States v. Hooks, 848 F.2d 785, 791 
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United States, 380 U.S. 343, 349 (1965), stated that the 
offense of filing a false return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 
S 7203, may be a lesser included offense of tax evasion in 
some circumstances. 
 
We find it unnecessary in this case to decide whether the 
district court committed an error in entering judgments of 
conviction and imposing sentences on both offenses. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that the district court 
erred, we conclude that the other prongs of the test under 
Rule 52(b) are not met. The sentences imposed on Gricco 
and McCardell for making false returns are concurrent to 
their sentences for tax evasion, and thus the former 
sentences do not increase the length of their incarceration. 
The only immediate practical effects of the concurrent 
sentences on the S 7206(1) counts are special assessments 
totaling $700 for each defendant. Recently, in United States 
v. Roberts, 262 F.3d 286, 292-94 (4th Cir. 2001), the court 
held that concurrent sentences and small special 
assessments were insufficient to show that the defendants' 
substantial rights had been affected by an alleged error and 
did not provide an adequate basis for the court, in the 
exercise of its discretion, to notice an error under Rule 
52(b). We reach the same conclusion here. We do not 
believe that Gricco and McCardell have suffered a 
deprivation of "substantial rights," and in the exercise of 
our discretion, we decline to entertain the argument that 
the defendants did not raise below. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
n.3 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that S 7206 is included within S 7201); United 
States v. Franks, 723 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1983) (finding no 
double sentencing because the S 7201 count was based on filing false tax 
returns which understated income, and the S 7206 count was based on 
tax returns that misrepresented information on foreign accounts); United 
States v. Pulawa, 532 F.2d 1301, 1301 (9th Cir. 1976) (S 7206 and 
S 7201 merge where the tax evasion was "accomplished by means, inter 
alia, of perjured tax returns"); see also United States v. Humphreys, 982 
F.2d 254, 262 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that S 7207, the misdemeanor of 
filing a false return is included within S 7201); United States v. Stone, 
702 F.2d 1333, 1340 (11th Cir. 1983) ("The government agrees that in 
this particular case the S 7206(1) offenses are lesser-included [offenses 
within S 7201]."). 
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IV. 
 
McCardell challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting his convictions for tax evasion, in violation of 
S 7201, and making false returns, in violation of S 7206(1). 
In considering this argument, we must again view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and ask 
whether a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that McCardell committed these offenses. See Frorup, 
963 F.2d at 42. 
 
At least ten participants in the underlying scheme 
testified that McCardell was involved in the thefts. In 
addition, Robert Walker, an investigator from the New 
Jersey Division of Criminal Justice, testified that from 1991 
to 1994, McCardell spent $161,000 in excess of 
documented income. App. at 998. IRS agent Frank Bucci 
took figures from Million's testimony about the proceeds 
that he received each year (which should be the same as 
McCardell's proceeds since they received equal portions) 
and compared these figures to the sums that McCardell 
had reported on his tax returns. App. at 1065-66. Agent 
Bucci concluded that the discrepancy between the two sets 
of numbers gave rise to an additional tax liability of 
$57,761 for the years 1992, 1993, and 1994. App. at 1059. 
McCardell does not dispute that he signed the tax returns, 
which contain declarations that the signatures were made 
under penalty of perjury. App. at 1140. Taken together, this 
evidence is sufficient to establish that McCardell attempted 
to evade taxes and made false returns. There is substantial 
evidence from which a rational factfinder could find beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the elements of both S 7201 and 
S 7206(1) were proven. 
 
V. 
 
Both appellants claim that the district court made 
erroneous evidentiary rulings relating to the prior state 
prosecution. First, they argue that the federal government 
was collaterally estopped from introducing evidence of the 
thefts because the appellants had already been acquitted of 
theft charges in state court. We reject this argument 
because collateral estoppel does not apply in successive 
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prosecutions by different sovereigns. United States v. Bell, 
113 F.3d 1345, 1351 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1106 n.18 (3d Cir. 1990). It is 
well settled that there is no violation of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause or the Due Process Clause in successive 
prosecutions for the same offense by the federal 
government and a state government. See, e.g., Abbate v. 
United States, 359 U.S. 187, 194 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 
359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959); United States v. Lanza , 260 U.S. 
377, 382 (1922). Since different sovereigns are permitted to 
prosecute the same defendant for the same crime,"[i]t 
would be anomalous indeed if a sovereign were allowed the 
greater power of reprosecuting individuals for offenses for 
which they had been acquitted but were denied the lesser 
power of proving the underlying facts of such offenses." 
United States v. Tirrell, 120 F.3d 670, 677 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 
Second, the appellants argue that the district court erred 
in refusing to admit evidence of their state acquittals. It is 
well established, however, that evidence of prior acquittals 
is generally inadmissible. See, e.g., United States v. De La 
Rosa, 171 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Marrero-Ortiz, 160 F.3d 768, 775 (1st Cir. 1998); United 
States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 228, 249-50 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 
Prince v. Lockhart, 971 F.2d 118, 122 (8th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Jones, 808 F.2d 561, 566 (7th Cir. 1986); 
United States v. Irvin, 787 F.2d 1506, 1516-17 (11th Cir. 
1986); United States v. Sutton, 732 F.2d 1483, 1492 (10th 
Cir. 1984); McKinney v. Galvin, 701 F.2d 584, 586 n.5 (6th 
Cir. 1983); United States v. Viserto, 596 F.2d 531, 537 (2d 
Cir. 1979). "A judgment of acquittal is relevant to the legal 
question of whether the prosecution is barred by the 
constitutional doctrine of double jeopardy or of collateral 
estoppel. But once it is determined that these pleas in bar 
have been rejected, a judgment of acquittal is not usually 
admissible to rebut inferences that may be drawn from the 
evidence that was admitted." United States v. Viserto, 596 
F.2d 531, 537 (2d Cir. 1979). "[A]lso a judgment of acquittal 
is hearsay. The Federal Rules of Evidence except from the 
operation of the hearsay rule only judgments of conviction, 
Rule 803(22), not judgments of acquittal." Id . See also, e.g., 
2 McCormick on Evidence, S 298 (John W. Strong ed., 5th 
ed. 1999). Judgments of acquittal, however, are still 
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inadmissible in large part because they may not present a 
determination of innocence, but rather only a decision that 
the prosecution has not met its burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Finally, even if the judgments of 
acquittal were admissible, exclusion under Fed. R. Evid. 
403 would be justified -- and highly recommended-- 
because the danger of jury confusion would greatly 
outweigh the evidence's limited probative value. 4 See, e.g., 
De La Rosa, 171 F.3d at 219-20. 
 
VI. 
 
Gricco argues that the district court erred in admitting 
evidence of his role in an earlier, separate scheme to 
embezzle money from the airport. Gricco contends that the 
district court should have excluded this evidence under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) because the government 
offered the evidence solely to show Gricco's propensity for 
criminal activity. 
 
In a pre-trial memorandum, the government revealed that 
it intended to introduce evidence that in 1988 Gricco had 
employed three cashiers to embezzle money from airport 
parking facilities using counterfeit replacement tickets that 
he provided to them. Government's Trial Memorandum, 
reproduced in Gricco Br. at A18. The government argued 
that this evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) 
because it "help[ed] establish Gricco's plan to steal money 
from the Airport, his opportunity to do so, his relationship 
with members of the scheme, and his intent and 
knowledge." Id. at A20. At trial, the cashiers who had 
participated in the earlier theft testified concerning Gricco's 
role in that plot. The government offered this testimony to 
show that, prior to the commencement of the scheme 
involved in this case, Gricco already knew that he could 
steal money from the parking facilities using counterfeit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. It has frequently been stated that judgments of acquittal are not even 
relevant on the issue of guilt because " `they do not necessarily prove 
innocence but may indicate only that the prosecution failed to meet its 
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to at least one element of 
the crime.' " McKinney v. Galvin, 701 F.2d 584, 586 n.5 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(citation omitted). 
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tickets and that he knew that he could rely on the cashiers 
who had participated in the earlier scheme. The 
government stated that the probative value of this evidence 
outweighed any unfair prejudicial effect because the 
evidence "does not suggest that the jury should reach a 
decision based on an improper basis; rather, the evidence 
is integral to establish the scheme." Id. at A19. 
 
The district court ordered that the evidence of the prior 
theft could be used only to establish "the relationship 
between Gricco and the cashiers he hired to steal, his 
opportunity to run the scheme to steal, and his intent and 
knowledge about the scheme." District Court's Pretrial 
Order, reproduced in Gricco Br. at A6.2. The district court 
also cautioned the jury on the limited use of the evidence 
and instructed it not to draw any inferences of bad 
character from it. App. at 218-19, 1402-04. 
 
A trial court's evidentiary rulings under Rule 404(b) "may 
be reversed only when they are clearly contrary to reason 
and not justified by the evidence." United States v. Murray, 
103 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation and quotation 
omitted). Even under this standard, we are doubtful about 
the propriety of admitting evidence of Gricco's involvement 
in the prior scheme. 
 
In order to admit evidence under Rule 404(b), "the 
proponent must clearly articulate how that evidence fits 
into a chain of logical inferences, no link of which may be 
the inference that the defendant has the propensity to 
commit the crime charged." United States v. Himelwright, 
42 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1994). Here, Gricco was on trial 
for tax offenses, not theft. While the evidence of the prior 
thefts may have been relevant to show an intent to commit 
further thefts, it is questionable whether this evidence was 
relevant to show an intent to commit the tax offenses. See 
id. ("In order to admit evidence under the`intent' 
component of Rule 404(b), intent must be an element of the 
crime charged and the evidence offered must cast light 
upon the defendant's intent to commit the crime.") 
(emphasis added). Nor was evidence of the earlier scheme 
particularly relevant to show Gricco's opportunity to carry 
out his tax offenses or the knowledge needed to do so. 
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We find it unnecessary, however, to decide whether the 
district court erred in admitting the evidence, because it is 
"highly probable that the evidence . . . did not contribute to 
the jury's judgment of conviction," Murray , 103 F.3d at 319 
(quoting previous Third Circuit precedent), and its 
admission was therefore harmless. Because there was 
overwhelming evidence in the form of the co-conspirators' 
testimony to establish the 1990-1994 scheme to steal from 
the Parking Authority, we are convinced that the jury would 
have found that Gricco derived unlawful gains from this 
scheme even without any evidence that Gricco had 
participated in the earlier scheme. Accordingly, the 
admission of the Rule 404(b) evidence is not a ground for 
reversal. 
 
VII. 
 
McCardell argues that the district court erred in 
admitting out-of-court statements under the co-conspirator 
exception to the hearsay rule.5See Fed. R. Evid. 
801(d)(2)(E). In making this argument, McCardell's brief 
cites a passage in the trial transcript in which McCardell's 
counsel objected when a cashier began to relate certain 
statements made to her by Gricco. McCardell Br. at 34. 
McCardell's attorney objected on the ground that there had 
been no evidence of Gricco's participation in a conspiracy 
and that Gricco's out-of-court statements were therefore 
inadmissible hearsay. App. at 92. The district court 
overruled the objection after the government assured the 
court that it would establish the existence of a conspiracy. 
App. at 92. 
 
We hold that Gricco's statements were properly admitted 
against McCardell under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), which governs 
statements by "a coconspirator of a party during the course 
and in furtherance of the conspiracy." To admit statements 
under this rule, it must be shown by a preponderance of 
the evidence that "(1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the declarant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Gricco's brief adopts by reference all of the applicable arguments made 
by McCardell, but this argument is not applicable to Gricco. Out-of-court 
statements by Gricco were admissions by a party opponent and are thus 
not hearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). 
 
                                16 
  
and the party against whom the statement is offered were 
members of the conspiracy; (3) the statement was made in 
the course of the conspiracy; and (4) the statement was 
made in furtherance of the conspiracy." United States v. 
Ellis, 156 F.3d 493, 496 (3d Cir. 1998). In this case, as we 
have held, the evidence sufficed to show that McCardell and 
Gricco both were members of a conspiracy having as one of 
its objectives the impeding of the IRS. In addition, the 
evidence very clearly showed that they were both members 
of a conspiracy to steal money from the airport. This latter 
conspiracy provided an additional basis for admitting co- 
conspirator statements even though this theft conspiracy 
was not charged in the indictment. See id. at 497 
(statements are admissible pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) 
even if the basis for admission is a conspiracy different 
from the one charged). Thus, the district court did not err 
in admitting Gricco's statements. 
 
VIII. 
 
The appellants raise numerous challenges to their 
sentences. We vacate the sentences and remand for a new 
calculation of the tax loss. On remand, the district court 
should make specific findings of fact rather than merely 
adopting the Presentence Reports (PSRs), as it did at the 
sentencing hearing. 
 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(b)(6) permits a 
sentencing court to accept a presentence report as its 
findings of fact, but there is an exception for"any 
unresolved objection" to the presentence report."For each 
matter controverted, the court must make either a finding 
on the allegation or a determination that no finding is 
necessary because the controverted matter will not be 
taken into account in, or will not affect, sentencing." Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1). We have stated that "[a] finding on a 
disputed fact or a disclaimer of reliance upon a disputed 
fact must be expressly made. . . . This Rule is strictly 
enforced and failure to comply with it is grounds for 
vacating the sentence." United States v. Electrodyne Sys. 
Corp., 147 F.3d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
Before the district court, the appellants disputed almost 
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all of the factual bases for sentencing, including the 
amount of tax loss, which dictated their base offense level. 
The PSRs did not detail how the tax loss was calculated, 
and the district court's brief statement that it was adopting 
the PSRs was inadequate to satisfy Rule 32(c)(1)'s  
requirements.6 Although defense counsel stated at the 
sentencing hearing that they would rely on their written 
objections rather than orally present their arguments, the 
district court should have made specific findings regarding 
the disputed facts that were relevant to sentencing. 
 
A. 
 
For tax offenses, a defendant's base offense level is 
determined by the tax loss. U.S.S.G. SS 2T1.1(a)(1), 2T1.9.7 
If the offenses involved underreporting of gross income on 
a personal tax return, the tax loss is treated as equal to 
28% of the unreported income, unless a more accurate 
determination of the tax loss can be made. U.S.S.G. 
S 2T1.1(c)(1)(A). The base offense level is 18 for a tax loss of 
more than $550,000 but less than $950,000. The base 
offense level is 19 for a tax loss of more than $950,000 but 
less than $1,500,000. The PSRs for Gricco and McCardell 
applied a base offense level of 19, based on a tax loss of 
$952,000. This amount was calculated by taking 28% of 
$3.4 million, the total sum of money that the government 
asserted was stolen from the airport. The PSRs adopted this 
$3.4 million figure from the government's sentencing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. At the sentencing hearing, the District Court stated: 
 
        I have read your arguments carefully, I have read the 
       government's response carefully. I have also read the probation 
       officer's response likewise. 
 
        I am satisfied this report is correct in all respects. I am 
therefore 
       going to find as a fact, that this is -- that these facts are 
accurate 
       and correct in all respects and I will therefore adopt these 
reports. 
 
App. at 1495. 
 
7. The 1998 Sentencing Guidelines apply. 
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memorandum. As we detail below, the sentencing 
memorandum was inadequate and inaccurate.8  
 
1. 
 
The Sentencing Guidelines provide that the base offense 
level shall be determined based on relevant conduct, which 
includes the defendant's own conduct and, "in the case of 
a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, 
scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the 
defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as 
a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions 
of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal 
activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense 
of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the 
course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for 
that offense." U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). In order to be 
included in determining the defendant's offense level, the 
loss resulting from the acts or omissions of others must be: 
"(1) in furtherance of the jointly undertaken activity; (2) 
within the scope of the defendant's agreement; and (3) 
reasonably foreseeable in connection with the criminal 
activity the defendant agreed to undertake." United States v. 
Duliga, 204 F.3d 97, 100 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
Here, the total tax loss associated with the funds stolen 
from the airport by all of the participants is properly 
attributed to both Gricco and McCardell. Any participant's 
failure to report unlawful proceeds was "in furtherance of 
the jointly undertaken activities," within the scope of the 
agreement, and "reasonably foreseeable" in connection with 
the embezzlement scheme. Id. Consequently, the tax loss 
arising from the total amount of money stolen from the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Just before oral arguments in this appeal, the government submitted 
a letter advising us that it would agree to a remand for reconsideration 
of the tax loss. The government stated that it would advocate a base 
offense level of 18 because its estimated tax loss of $952,000 was only 
$2000 above the threshold for a base offense level of 19. The government 
stated that it continued to believe its calculations to be permissible and 
persuasive. We have found several errors in the government's 
calculations, and we therefore find it necessary to remand for a complete 
recalculation. 
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airport by all of the participants is properly attributed to 
both appellants. 
 
2. 
 
A sentencing court is permitted to make "a reasonable 
estimate based on the available facts" where the exact 
amount of tax loss may be uncertain. Application Note 1 to 
U.S.S.G. S 2T1.1; see also United States v. Spencer, 178 
F.3d 1365, 1368 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Bryant, 
128 F.3d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1997). Since the cashiers who 
testified admitted that they did not report any of their illicit 
gains on their tax returns, the assumption that the entire 
amount stolen from the airport contributed to the tax loss 
is valid. The district court was not obligated to pore 
through the tax returns of all of the participants in the 
airport theft to determine the exact amount of unreported 
income. See Spencer, 178 F.3d at 1368 (refusing to require 
a court to scrutinize all employee tax returns over the 
course of an employer's fraudulent scheme in order to 
generate a more precise tax loss computation). 
 
The estimate of the tax loss, however, still must be 
reasonable and based on available facts. The government's 
brief on appeal offers one method for arriving at the $3.4 
million that it alleges was the total amount stolen from the 
airport. At trial, government expert Jeffrey Gemunder 
testified that airport records revealed that $1,396,960 was 
stolen between September 1993 and September 1994. App. 
at 855. The government's brief reasons as follows: (1) 
Flannery testified that his proceeds increased by 10-20% 
each year between 1990 and 1994, and Million testified 
that his proceeds increased by 20-50% each year; (2) to give 
the appellants "the benefit of the doubt," the government 
picked 30% as the annual growth rate of the scheme; (3) 
since the scheme grew by 30% each year and $1,396,960 
was stolen during the last year of the four-year scheme, the 
amount stolen during the third year was 70% of 
$1,396,960 or $977,872); (4) the amount stolen during the 
second year was 70% of the amount stolen in the third year 
and so forth; and (5) the amounts stolen per year add up 
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to roughly $3.4 million. Gov't Br. at 78-9. 
 
There are several errors in this approach. First, the 
testimony of Flannery and Million does not support the 
percentage growth figures on which the government relies. 
Flannery and Million estimated the amounts of money that 
they derived from the scheme each year, and these figures 
are not consistent with the percentage ranges given by the 
government.9 Second, even if these percentages are 
accepted, the government has not provided a reasonable 
explanation for choosing an overall growth rate of 30%. The 
government says that it gave the appellants the benefit of 
the doubt, but if it had really done so, it would have chosen 
the highest percentage in the ranges. Third, even accepting 
the 30% figure, the government's method of calculating 
income in prior years is mathematically incorrect. 10 Fourth, 
the government's method was not used in the PSRs or by 
the district court. In fact, this method was not even 
presented to the district court. The government's brief on 
appeal offers only this post-hoc justification and fails to 
explain how the PSRs or the district court arrived at the 
$3.4 million.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The chart below shows the illegal income to which Flannery and 
Million testified: 
 
                     Flannery             Million 
                     (App. at 228-29)     (App. at 389-90)  
1990                 $30,000              $400 / week  
1991                 $70,000-80,000       $500-600 / week  
1992                 $80,000-90,000       $750 /week  
1993                 $100,000             $2000 / week  
Jan. - Sept. 1994    $72,000-75,000       $3000-3300 / week  
1990-1994            $300,000             $345,000-400,000 
    
 
10. Instead of calculating 70% of the income obtained in the later year, 
the income earned in the later should have been divided by 1.3. 
 
11. The government's brief on appeal offers one other method of 
calculating the loss of $3.4 million: "When Million was asked how much 
he believed he made in total, he testified that he made at least $400,000. 
That means that the four top level thieves made at least $1.6 million 
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The government did file a sentencing memorandum with 
the district court and, presumably, this is what the district 
court and the PSRs relied upon. The memorandum arrived 
at a total theft loss of $3.4 million by adding together (a) 
the unlawful proceeds that the testifying cashiers admitted 
to earning, (b) the amounts earned by nontestifying 
cashiers, based on the assumption that each cashier 
earned $600 for each week that he or she participated in 
the theft, (c) the $297,000 that Million testified to receiving, 
(d) the $352,000 that Flannery testified to receiving, and (e) 
$352,000 attributed to each of Gricco and McCardell, based 
on the inference that each received the same amount as 
Flannery's cut. The memorandum resolved all ambiguities 
in the defendants' favor and summed up these figures to 
arrive at a total theft lost of "at least $2,559,600."12 App. at 
1483-84. The sentencing memorandum then concluded 
that "[g]iven the expert testimony in the case, the loss easily 
reached $3.4 million for a tax loss of $952,000, establishing 
a base offense level of 19." App. at 1484. The government 
has not offered any explanation for the leap from 
$2,559,600 to $3.4 million and has not pointed to any 
expert testimony supporting such a leap. Since the 
government's memorandum, the district court, and the 
PSRs all fail to provide a coherent factual basis for the 
calculation of a $3.4 million theft loss, the corresponding 
tax loss of $952,000 is not a "reasonable estimate."13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
[since they received cuts equal to that of Million], leaving $1.8 million 
for 
the other 15 thieves to reach a theft loss figure of $3.4 million. 
Plainly, 
there was sufficient evidence in the record for the court to find a theft 
loss of $3.4 million and a resultant tax loss of $952,000." Gov't Br. at 
78-79. We fail to see how this circular reasoning leads to a finding that 
the theft loss was $3.4 million. 
 
12. It does not appear that the government added up its own numbers 
correctly. 
 
13. The appellants' sentencing memorandum comes up with a total theft 
loss of $1,668,500. App. at 1454. We see several errors in this figure, 
including miscalculation of the amounts received by the testifying 
cashiers, omission of the amounts received by the non-testifying 
cashiers, and improper limitation of the tax loss to the years 1992, 1993, 
and 1994. Under the relevant conduct provisions of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, the tax loss arising from the entire scheme, from 1990 to 
1994, should be attributed to the appellants. 
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Accordingly, we remand for a new calculation of the 
amount of tax loss. 
 
B. 
 
McCardell appeals the four-level increase in his base 
offense level under U.S.S.G. S 3B1.1 for his aggravating 
role. The Guidelines provide for such a four-level increase 
"[i]f the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal 
activity that involved five or more participants or was 
otherwise extensive." U.S.S.G. S 3B1.1(a). The Guidelines 
provide for a three-level increase if the defendant was a 
manager or supervisor, but not an organizer or leader, in 
an extensive criminal activity, and a two-level increase if 
the defendant had a leadership role in less extensive 
criminal activity. U.S.S.G. SS 3B1.1(b) and (c). Factors to 
consider include: 
 
       (1) the exercise of decision making authority; (2) the 
       nature of participation in the commission of the 
       offense; (3) the recruitment of accomplices; (4) the 
       claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the 
       crime; (5) the degree of participation in planning or 
       organizing the offense; (6) the nature and scope of the 
       illegal activity; and (7) the degree of control and 
       authority exercised over others. 
 
United States v. Hunter, 52 F.3d 489, 492 (3d Cir. 1995). 
The determination of a defendant's role is based on all 
conduct within the scope of the relevant conduct guideline, 
U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3, and not solely on the acts in the counts 
of conviction. Introductory Commentary to U.S.S.G. Ch. 3 
Pt. B. 
 
The district court did not err in applying the leadership 
role enhancement to McCardell. McCardell's role in the 
theft is relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3, and the 
scheme involved four leaders and at least 15 cashiers. 
Flannery, Million, and the cashiers testified that McCardell 
was one of the four leaders of the scheme. App. at 81, 192, 
281, 309, 364. Million described McCardell as the"second 
man in command" under Gricco, and one cashier testified 
that McCardell was in charge when Gricco was not present. 
App. at 93, 112, 364, 384. Although Flannery came up with 
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the ticket-swapping plan and initially approached Million 
and Gricco to participate, Flannery testified that McCardell 
was involved in discussions regarding the development and 
expansion of the scheme. App. at 211, 225. McCardell was 
also involved in the enlistment and training of cashiers and 
was present when at least one cashier was recruited. App. 
at 91, 382. He helped to distribute the counterfeit tickets to 
the cashiers and often collected the money at the end of the 
day. App. at 99, 100, 220-21. McCardell received the same 
amount of unlawful proceeds as Gricco, Million, and 
Flannery. App. at 225. This evidence supports the four-level 
increase in McCardell's offense level. 
 
C. 
 
McCardell contests the two-level increase he received 
because he "failed to report or to correctly identify the 
source of income exceeding $10,000 in any year from 
criminal activity." U.S.S.G. S 2T1.1(b)(1). McCardell argues 
that the government did not prove that his unreported 
income exceeded $10,000 in any of the relevant years. 
 
Flannery and Million testified to the amounts they 
received in each of the years from 1990 to 1994, and these 
annual amounts greatly exceeded $10,000. See supra note 
9. These amounts apply to McCardell as well, since he and 
the three other leaders received equal cuts. McCardell 
reported a total taxable income of $30,195 in 1992; 
$22,955 in 1993; and $27,643 in 1994. App. at 111a, 
118a, 126a. Subtracting these reported figures from the 
amounts he gained from the theft scheme shows that he 
had more than $10,000 in unreported income each year. 
IRS Agent Bucci also testified that McCardell's unreported 
income for the three-year period between 1992 and 1994 
was $239,5000. App. at 1066. The sentencing enhancement 
was proper. 
 
D. 
 
McCardell's and Gricco's offense levels were increased by 
two levels because the district court believed that their 
offenses "involved sophisticated concealment." U.S.S.G. 
S 2T1.1(b)(2). Application Note 4 to U.S.S.G.S 2T1.1(b)(2) 
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describes sophisticated concealment as "especially complex 
or especially intricate offense conduct in which deliberate 
steps are taken to make the offense, or its extent, difficult 
to detect. Conduct such as hiding assets or transactions, or 
both, through the use of fictitious entities, corporate shells, 
or offshore bank accounts ordinarily indicates sophisticated 
concealment." The government supports the application of 
this enhancement with evidence that the appellants 
engaged in intricate financial transactions to hide their 
unlawful income from the IRS and also used counterfeit 
parking tickets as a sophisticated means of concealing their 
theft of money from the airport. The appellants argue that 
the use of the counterfeit tickets and the complexity of the 
embezzlement scheme do not demonstrate sophisticated 
concealment because the sophisticated concealment must 
be in relation to the tax evasion, not the theft scheme. 
 
In United States v. Cianci, 154 F.3d 106 (3d Cir. 1998), 
the defendant pled guilty to tax evasion stemming from his 
failure to report income obtained through embezzlement 
and kickbacks. His plea agreement stipulated that the 
offense level should be increased under the sophisticated 
concealment provision. He later challenged this increase, 
contending that while his embezzlement scheme was 
sophisticated, his means of hiding income from the IRS was 
not. This court's ultimate holding was that the defendant 
could not challenge the increase because he was bound by 
the stipulation in his plea agreement. Id. at 110. The court 
did note that even if it were to look beyond the stipulation, 
there would be adequate support for the finding that the 
defendant "employed sophisticated means to conceal his tax 
evasion from the IRS." Id. at 110 (emphasis added). He used 
shell corporations, falsified documents, and failed to record 
cash payments. The court also observed: "Admittedly, the 
methods devised by Cianci impeded discovery by [his 
employer] of his embezzlement, but they also facilitated 
concealment of the income derived from the embezzlement 
and thereby the necessity to report it to the government and 
pay taxes on it." Id. (emphasis added). Such methods 
included accepting benefits in the form of a car and money 
orders instead of cash and falsifying the company's records 
in order to impede discovery of his unlawful income. 
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It is clear that the Cianci panel viewed the complexity of 
the embezzlement and kickback schemes as inadequate in 
themselves to support a sophisticated-concealment 
enhancement. Instead, the panel looked to the complexity 
of the measures taken to conceal the tax evasion in order 
to justify application of the sophisticated concealment 
enhancement. Moreover, the Background Commentary to 
U.S.S.G. S 2T1.1 states: "Although tax offenses always 
involve some planning, unusually sophisticated efforts to 
conceal the offense decrease the likelihood of detection and 
therefore warrant an additional sanction for deterrence 
purposes." (emphasis added). This statement supports the 
interpretation that efforts to conceal must be efforts to 
conceal the tax offense in order to be considered under this 
Guideline. 
 
Although the appellants interpret the Guideline properly, 
the findings that the appellants engaged in sophisticated 
concealment of their tax offenses are well-supported by the 
evidence. Gricco loaned cash to others and asked for 
repayment in the form of money orders and checks made 
out to him or to a title company. App. at 129, 451, 535, 
571. He purchased real estate in his name and in the 
names of family members. He gave cash to family members 
and received checks in return to buy more property. App. 
at 403-04. Between 1991 and 1994, Gricco spent over 
$1.365 million on real estate purchases. Of this amount, 
$160,000 was in cash, and $121,000 was from relatives. 
App. at 989. Capozzi, Gricco's real estate agent, testified 
that Gricco used large amounts of cash for his purchases 
and instructed Capozzi to "keep a low profile." App. at 628- 
630. Capozzi converted the cash into money orders and 
then deposited it into an escrow account used for 
purchasing properties. In order to avoid filing currency 
transaction reports with the IRS, Capozzi purchased the 
money orders in small amounts and occasionally went to 
several different branches of the same bank to purchase 
the money orders. App. at 629-32. An investigator with the 
New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice testified that Gricco 
had deposited $372,000 of cash into banks between 1991 
and 1994 but that not a single deposit was for more than 
$10,000. App. at 974. Gricco would have had to file a 
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report with the IRS if his deposits had exceeded that 
amount. 
This evidence supports a finding of sophisticated 
concealment through currency structuring, use of cash to 
avoid reporting requirements, and the use of family 
members' names to hide assets. See, e.g., United States v. 
Middlemiss, 217 F.3d 112, 124 (2d Cir. 2000) (hiding assets 
by placing them under family members' names, concealing 
interests in a business, creating an extensive false paper 
trail of corporate documents, and accepting only cash 
payments for the extortion they committed established 
sophisticated concealment); United States v. Guidry, 199 
F.3d 1150, 1158-59 (10th Cir. 1999) (structuring 
transactions to avoid Currency Transaction Reports serves 
"the main purpose of shielding the transaction from the 
Internal Revenue Service," and properly served as a basis 
for the enhancement). 
 
The district court also did not err in applying the 
enhancement to McCardell. Real estate agent Capozzi 
testified that McCardell's wife used cash to purchase 
properties under both her name and McCardell's name. 
App. at 658, 661, 673-76. Between 1991 and 1994, 
McCardell spent $341,000 on real estate purchases. Of this 
amount, $33,000 was in cash, and $80,000 came from the 
accounts of family members. App. at 1001-02. McCardell 
explained the cash flow from his mother-in-law by asserting 
that his wife received money from her to pay her bills. App. 
at 1129. However, conduct may support an inference of a 
tax evasion motive even if a defendant proffers an innocent 
rationale for his or her conduct. Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1090. 
Between 1991 and 1994, McCardell deposited about 
$169,000 of cash into banks, but none of the deposits 
involved more than $10,000 at any one time. This evidence 
showed that McCardell structured his currency 
transactions, laundered money through real estate 
purchases, and hid assets under family members' names. 
The district court did not clearly err in finding that these 
activities constituted more than run-of-the-mill tax evasion. 
 
E. 
 
Gricco and McCardell received a two-level increase in 
their offense levels because each "abused a position of 
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public or private trust, or used a special skill, in a manner 
that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment 
of the offense." U.S.S.G. S 3B1.3. The appellants argue that 
they never held a position of trust in relation to the victim 
which, in this case, is the IRS. They further argue that they 
did not even hold a position of trust at the airport at which 
they were employed. 
 
The appellants' first argument is directly foreclosed by 
United States v. Cianci, supra. In Cianci, the defendant was 
convicted of tax evasion for failing to report income that he 
had received from embezzlement and kickbacks. The 
defendant's position as a high-ranking official in a 
corporation enabled him to embezzle money and receive 
kickbacks but, the defendant argued, he did not hold a 
position of trust with respect to the IRS, and the IRS was 
the victim of his offense of conviction. This court rejected 
the defendant's argument, reasoning that consideration of 
the defendant's trust relationship to his corporation was 
proper consideration of "relevant conduct" under U.S.S.G 
S 1B1.3 for sentencing purposes. Cianci , 154 F.3d at 112. 
Accordingly, we must reject Gricco's legal argument. 
 
We review for clear error the findings that McCardell and 
Gricco held positions of trust vis-a-vis the airport. Gricco 
was the regional manager for the parking lots at the airport. 
App. at 1117. He supervised the parking lots, was 
responsible for staffing, and operated the petty cash fund at 
the lots. App. at 1177. McCardell was employed as a 
supervisor at the parking facilities. He watched the toll 
plazas, collected the receipts from the cashiers, handled 
customer complaints, and did "just about everything." App. 
at 1114. Both Gricco and McCardell had sufficient 
managerial and discretionary authority to warrant 
sentencing enhancements for an abuse of a position of 
trust. 
 
F. 
 
Gricco and McCardell each received a two-level increase 
under U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice. The 
appellants' PSRs indicated that the enhancement was 
applied because the appellants "testified falsely regarding 
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[a] material matter during trial." App. at 1492. The 
appellants claim that they did nothing but testify in their 
own defense at trial and that this cannot be the basis for 
an obstruction of justice enhancement. This argument was 
squarely rejected by the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993) (holding that the 
enhancement does not violate a defendant's right to testify 
and is properly applied where the defendant commits 
perjury). 
 
The appellants further argue that the district court erred 
by failing to make findings as to which of their statements 
were perjurious. The Supreme Court has required 
sentencing courts to "review the evidence and make 
independent findings necessary to establish a willful 
impediment to, or obstruction of, justice" under the 
definition of perjury.14 Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 95. Our court, 
has held, however, that express findings on the elements of 
perjury, although preferable, are not required. See United 
States v. Boggi, 74 F.3d 470, 479 (3d Cir. 1996). In Boggi, 
the sentencing court stated: "I don't see how, in view of his 
flat denials and the jury's conviction, that you can find 
otherwise than that he testified falsely on the stand." Id. at 
478. Although the sentencing court did not make express 
findings as to the elements of perjury, our court reviewed 
the record and found that the district court's application of 
the enhancement necessarily included findings on the 
elements and that the findings were supported by the 
record. The reference to "flat denials," we concluded, was a 
finding that Boggi willfully intended to provide false 
testimony and that the untruths were material because 
Boggi would not have been convicted had the jury believed 
him. Accordingly, we refused to remand "merely because 
the district court failed to engage in a ritualistic exercise 
and state the obvious for the record." Id. at 479. 
 
The district court here likewise failed to make specific 
findings as to which statements constituted perjury. The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. A witness testifying under oath or affirmation commits perjury if she 
"gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful 
intent 
to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, 
or faulty memory." Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 94. 
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district court stated only that Gricco had "testified falsely 
regarding material matter during trial" and that McCardell 
was receiving "[t]wo levels upward adjustment for 
obstruction of justice." App. at 1492, 1494. Nevertheless, as 
in Boggi, we will not remand simply for the district court to 
make findings of fact that are implicit in the record. It is 
obvious that Gricco and McCardell -- both of whom denied 
any participation in embezzling the money from the airport 
and in underreporting their income -- committed perjury. 
 
G. 
 
The appellants argue that the district court failed to 
comply with 18 U.S.C. S 3553(c)(1), which requires a 
sentencing court to state in open court its reasons for 
imposing a sentence at a particular point within a 
Guideline range if that range spans more than 24 months. 
The Guideline range determined by the District Court was 
108-135 months, and the court sentenced McCardell to 108 
months of imprisonment and Gricco to 120 months. Before 
pronouncing sentence, the district court made some 
preliminary comments: 
 
       One, is this [sic] the kind of offense that occurs much 
       too often in this community and almost becomes a way 
       of life. And, these two defendants were very important 
       people in organizing and carrying out this thing, to the 
       extent that just about the entire Parking Authority at 
       the airport was corrupted through it, even to the extent 
       of recruitments to engage in it. For that reason, it 
       seems to me that this is a very serious matter and one 
       that should be dealt with appropriately to somehow get 
       the message across to this community, that this kind 
       of action simply cannot be tolerated. 
 
App. at 1513. Since the district court did give concrete 
reasons for its choice of sentences, it satisfied the 
requirements of 18 U.S.C. S 3553(c)(1).15 See United States 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The explanation given by the district court sufficiently explains why 
it did not sentence Gricco to a lower term of imprisonment within the 
Guidelines range. The district court sentenced McCardell to the shortest 
term allowed by the Guideline range. Although the District Court did not 
provide an explanation for McCardell's sentence, this error is harmless, 
as McCardell received the lightest sentence possible. 
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v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 344 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[I]t is sufficient 
for the court to advert to a given factor or factors in 
selecting a point within the range."). 
 
H. 
 
McCardell challenges the district court's finding that he 
had the ability to pay a fine. McCardell did not contest the 
portions of the PSR showing that he had assets of $215,111 
and no outstanding debts, although he did have a negative 
net monthly cash flow of $960.41. McCardell PSRPP 58, 
59, 64. At sentencing, the district court noted that 
McCardell had rather substantial assets and decided that 
McCardell could trim down his standard of living and pay 
a fine out of his assets. App. at 1501. The district court's 
finding is not clearly erroneous, and we uphold the $75,000 
fine that was imposed. 
 
I. 
 
The appellants also challenge their sentences under 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). However, 
their sentences do not run afoul of Apprendi because the 
appellants were sentenced below the statutory maximum 
for each count of conviction. See United States v. Williams, 
235 F.3d 858 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
J. 
 
The government agrees that the District Court applied 
the wrong version of 18 U.S.C. S 3013 in imposing the 
special assessments. For felony offenses, the amount of 
special assessment is $50 per count if committed prior to 
April 24, 1996, and $100 per count if committed after that 
date. 18 U.S.C. S 3013; Application Note 2 to U.S.S.G. 
S 5E1.3. The tax conspiracy for which the appellants were 
convicted occurred from 1990 to 1997. Gricco filed his 
return for the 1992 calendar year in 1993. Thus, Gricco 
should have been assessed $100 for the conspiracy 
conviction, $100 for tax evasion committed in 1997 by filing 
the false 1994 tax return, $100 for filing the false 1994 tax 
return in 1997, $100 for tax evasion committed in 1997 by 
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filing the false 1993 tax return, $100 for filing the false 
1993 tax return in 1997, $50 for tax evasion committed in 
1993 by filing the false 1992 tax return, and $50 for filing 
the false 1992 tax return. McCardell filed his tax returns 
for the 1992, 1993, and 1994 calendar years in 1993, 
1994, and 1995, respectively. Accordingly, he should have 
been assessed $50 for tax evasion based on each of these 
tax returns and $50 for filing each of these returns, as well 
as $100 for the conspiracy. We remand for the district 
court to impose the correct assessments. 
 
IX. 
 
In sum, we affirm the appellants' convictions, but we 
vacate their sentences and remand for new sentencing 
proceedings and re-sentencing. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part: 
 
I concur with the majority in all aspects of its opinion 
except for my colleagues' conclusion that there was 
sufficient evidence to convict McCardell of a Klein 
conspiracy. In United States v. Alston, 77 F.3d 713 (3d Cir. 
1995) we held: 
 
       A Klein conspiracy is comprised of three elements: (1) 
       the existence of an agreement, (2) an overt act by one 
       of the conspirators in furtherance of the agreement's 
       objectives, and (3) an intent on the part of the 
       conspirators to agree, as well as to defraud the United 
       States. 
 
Id. at 720 n.17 (citation, internal quotations and brackets 
omitted). Although a defendant's failure to report income 
can be an overt act in furtherance of a Klein conspiracy, 
the government must "still prove there was an agreement 
whose purpose was to impede the IRS (the conspiracy), and 
that each defendant knowingly participated in that 
conspiracy." United States v. Adkinson, 158 F.3d 1147, 
1154 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). Of course, where 
there is no direct evidence "of an agreement by all for each 
to evade his income taxes," the government can rely on 
circumstantial proof. Id. 
 
However, "[t]he failure to disclose income is, without 
more, generally insufficient to establish a Klein conspiracy." 
Id. "To be sufficient, the evidence must establish an 
agreement among the conspirators with the intent to 
obstruct the government's knowledge and collection of the 
revenue due." Id. "When the government relies upon 
circumstantial evidence to establish a tax conspiracy, the 
circumstances must be such as to warrant a jury's finding 
that the alleged conspirators had some common design 
with unity of purpose to impede the IRS." Id.  A Klein 
conspiracy is not established if the evidence implies only 
separate purposes to evade taxes. Id. at 1155. Rather, the 
evidence must "support an inference that each alleged tax 
evader . . . knew of the others' tax evasion" and that "they 
agreed to [evade taxes]." Id. "Although each defendant does 
not have to know every act taken in furtherance of the 
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conspiracy, each defendant . . . must know that there is a 
conspiracy and demonstrate a specific intent to join it." Id. 
 
McCardell argues that the government never produced 
any evidence that he spoke to, or agreed with, anyone 
about evading federal income taxes. Significantly, the 
government appears to concede that point. Its recitation of 
the evidence that McCardell was a Klein conspirator 
amounts to the following: (1) he told Million that he was 
concerned about alerting the IRS by exchanging large 
quantities of old $100 bills for new ones at a bank; (2) he 
did not report the stolen money on his federal tax returns; 
(3) he deposited small sums of cash to avoid generating a 
currency transaction report ("CTR"); (4) he purchased real 
estate; (5) he used Capozzi to purchase real estate and to 
launder the stolen money, Government's Br. at 58 n.14; 
and (6) he purchased a safe at Gricco's direction. Id. at 42 
n.8. 
 
I agree that the evidence is sufficient to allow a rational 
jury to conclude that McCardell did all of these things to 
avoid paying taxes, and to avoid detection; and not just to 
hide the proceeds of the theft. However, as noted, a Klein 
conspiracy requires more. That crime is not established if 
the evidence implies only separate purposes to evade taxes. 
Adkinson, at 1155. On the contrary, the evidence must 
"support an inference that each alleged tax evader . . . 
knew of the others' tax evasion" and "that they agreed to do 
so." Id. I do not believe that a jury could reasonably 
conclude that this evidence proves that McCardell knew of 
anyone else's tax evasion, much less that he agreed with 
anyone else to evade the payment of income taxes. 
 
Essentially, the government's case against McCardell is 
that "the jury could infer that Gricco spoke to McCardell, 
his brother-in-law and chief assistant, at least that he 
spoke to his lower level thieves, and Million and Flannery, 
about impeding the IRS," because his conduct paralleled 
Gricco's conduct and the other Klein co-conspirators' 
conduct. Government's Br. at 58 n.14. Therefore, claims 
the government, there is sufficient evidence to support 
McCardell's conviction as a Klein conspirator. 
 
Although there is authority for the proposition that a 
defendant's connection to a Klein conspiracy need only be 
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"slight," Adkinson, at 1152 (citation omitted), the reference 
to "slight" refers to the "extent of the defendant's 
connection to the conspiracy, not to the quantum of 
evidence required to prove that connection." Id., at 1152 
n.10 (citation omitted). Obviously, the government must 
still meet its constitutional burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and "slight" proof that a defendant 
committed a crime simply can not support a criminal 
conviction. Id. at 1152. At best, the government's evidence 
of McCardell's guilt of a Klein conspiracy was "slight." At 
worst, it was pure speculation. Far from resting upon 
substantial evidence, the government's case against 
McCardell boils down to the bare-bones contention that 
because Gricco, Flannery, Million and the cashiers were 
Klein conspirators; McCardell must also have been one. 
That is nothing more than an attempt to boot strap 
McCardell's conduct in the theft scheme into a Klein 
conspiracy by suggesting that it paralleled the conduct of 
Gricco and the other Klein conspirators. However, the 
majority correctly concedes that parallel conduct is not, by 
itself, enough to prove a Klein conspiracy. Majority Op. at 
7. Yet, that is the only "proof " of McCardell's guilt of that 
offense. 
 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority's 
decision insofar as it affirms McCardell's conviction for a 
Klein conspiracy. 
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